Protecting the Elderly from Displacement by Condominium Conversions: Troy, Ltd. v. Renna {580 F. Supp. 69} by Troxell, Jerilynn D.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 30 Housing Symposium
January 1986
Protecting the Elderly from Displacement by
Condominium Conversions: Troy, Ltd. v. Renna
{580 F. Supp. 69}
Jerilynn D. Troxell
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jerilynn D. Troxell, Protecting the Elderly from Displacement by Condominium Conversions: Troy, Ltd. v. Renna {580 F. Supp. 69}, 30
Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 275 (1986)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol30/iss1/12
PROTECTING THE ELDERLY FROM
DISPLACEMENT BY CONDOMINIUM
CONVERSIONS: TROY, LTD. v. RENNA
Although condominium conversion' offers cities a chance for urban
revitalization2 and extends the benefits of home ownership' to individ-
uals, it also may disrupt the lives of elderly persons4 by displacing them
from their homes into a limited rental housing market.5 In response,
state and local governments have enacted laws that protect the elderly
I. Condominium conversion is defined as "a change in the legal form of a multi-
family rental property from single ownership by a landlord to multiple ownership."
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URB. DEV., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO
CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 1, 1-6 (1980).
2. Principally, condominium conversion revitalizes cities by encouraging resettle-
ment and thereby increasing the property tax base. Note, Fifth Amendment Takings
and Condominium Conversion Regulations That Restrict Owner Occupancy Rights, 62
B.U.L. REV. 467, 470 (1982). In addition, conversion may encourage the improvement
of neighborhoods. Id. Studies also show that the presence of property owners in an
area enhances neighborhood stability. Id.
3. Individuals benefit from home ownership by acquiring an equity interest, deduct-
ing mortgage and property tax payments from federal taxes, and profiting from appreci-
ation of their property. Note, The Condominium Conversion Problem: Causes and
Solutions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 306, 310. Because converted condominiums are less expen-
sive than both single family homes and new condominiums, they allow a larger group of
persons to own homes. Condominium Housing Issues: Hearings on S.612 Before the
Subcomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1979)
(report of the National Council of Senior Citizens) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
4. Hearings, supra note 3, at 106.
5. Id. at 108. Because many elderly tenants cannot afford the necessary down pay-
ment and carrying charges on a condominium, they are forced to move out. Id. at 113.
Although the availability of rental housing fluctuates, it is generally low. Id. at 103.
The "rental vacancy rate," the percentage relationship of vacant year-round units for
rent compared to the total rent inventory, for the nation is 7.1%. U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SUM-
MARY, PART 1, 1-59 (1980). Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas average rates of
6.7%, but some areas range as low as 1.2%. Id. The scarcity of rental housing often
forces the elderly to devote large portions of their income to rent. Thus, the amount left
to pay for food, medical and utility bills is decreased. Hearings, supra note 3, at 114-15.
Conversion has not caused the housing shortages, but exacerbates them by narrowing
the housing options available to elderly renters. Note, supra note 3, at 312.
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from the harmful effects of condominium conversion.6 These laws
have prompted challenges by condominium developers and purchasers
under the impairment of contracts7 and fifth amendment takings'
clauses. The challengers urge courts to articulate frameworks that will
consistently impose limits on a state's power to impair contracts and
clearly differentiate between takings compensable under the fifth
amendment and uncompensable takings under regulations enacted in
the public interest. In Troy, Ltd. v. Renna,9 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit rejected such a challenge by condominium develop-
ers and purchasers. The court held that a New Jersey statute retroac-
tively protecting elderly tenants constituted a proper exercise of the
state's regulatory power rather than an unconstitutional taking or im-
pairment of contract.10
Troy, Ltd. (Troy), owner of the Troy Hills apartment complex, sold
its rental property to East Coast Condo Tech, Inc. (East Coast). East
Coast subsequently converted the units into condominiums" and exe-
6. See Michigan (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.50 (204a) - (204e) (Callahan 1984)). See
also New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.22-.39 (West Supp. 1983)) and New
York (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee (McKinney 1980)) (protects the elderly from
conversion-related evictions by granting them extended tenancy periods). In addition,
local governments also protect elderly tenants by passing ordinances regulating conver-
sions. Note, supra note 2, at 471-72.
These local regulations fall into three categories. Id. First, conversion bans prohibit
conversions entirely. Cities often enact them as temporary, emergency measures during
a housing crisis. Id. at 471. Second, removal controls allow municipalities to control
the removal of rental housing from the market. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDI-
NANCE 966 (1981). Third, eviction controls limit the ability of owners to evict tenants.
Note, supra note 2, at 472. These latter types of controls vary widely. One local ordi-
nance initially required that owners obtain "certificates of eviction" before evicting ten-
ants. BROOKLINE, MASS., BY-LAws, art. XXXVIII (1979). The city later toughened
its standard by prohibiting all evictions when the tenant continuously occupied the unit
prior to the filing of the condominium master deed. BROOKLINE, MASS., BY-LAWS art.
XXXVIII, § 9(a) (1979).
7. "No State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
8. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 4.
9. 727 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 303.
11. Id. at 293. Several laws govern the conversion process in New Jersey. The New
Jersey Condominium Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8B-1 to 30 (West Supp. 1983), re-
quires converters to file a master deed to effect the changeover from rental property to
condominiums. The converter must then comply with the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 to 61.12 (West Supp. 1983). This compliance includes serv-
ing tenants with a three-year notice of termination. Eighteen months after such notice,
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cuted sales contracts with two of the plaintiffs.12 One month later, the
New Jersey Legislature enacted the Senior Citizens and Disabled Pro-
tected Tenancy Act (Tenancy Act). 3 The Tenancy Act grants cer-
tain 4 elderly and disabled tenants residing in buildings slated for
conversion a forty year protective tenancy. Section fourteen"5 permits
courts to grant protective tenancies retroactively to persons in units
tenants may request the landlord to locate and offer "comparable housing." Id. at
§ 2A:18-61.11(a). If the landlord does not comply, New Jersey courts can issue up to
five one-year stays of eviction. Id. The landlord, however, can elect to pay a tenant a
"hardship relocation compensation" after the first stay of eviction. This payment pre-
cludes a court from issuing further stays. Id. § 2A:18-61.1 1(c). East Coast properly
effected the changeover and served all tenants with the three-year notice. 727 F.2d at
293.
12. Id. When these purchasers executed sales contracts they expected tenants to
vacate according to the terms of the Anti-Eviction Act-eight years at the latest.
13. The Tenancy Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.22 to 61.39 (West Supp. 1983),
is an extension of the Anti-Eviction Act, designed to more fully protect the elderly and
disabled from displacement into a severely limited housing market. 727 F.2d at 290.
New Jersey has one of the worst rental vacancy rates in the nation at 4.8%. U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS-
NEW JERSEY, PART 32, 32-9 (1980). Springfield Township, where Troy Hills is lo-
cated, has an extremely low vacancy rate of 1.2%. Id. at 32-214. Because the legisla-
ture found that displacement of the elderly adversely affected communities, it granted
senior citizens special protection. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.23 (West Supp. 1983).
This protection took the form of a "protected period of tenancy, during which [the
elderly and disabled] are entitled to the fair enjoyment of the dwelling unit ... to
continue for such time, up to 40 years, as the conditions and circumstances which make
necessary such protected tenancy shall continue." Id. A landlord can still evict these
tenants for failure to comply with terms of the lease. 727 F.2d at 298. Although rent
increases are allowed, costs of conversion that fail to add services not previously pro-
vided for cannot be passed on to protected tenants. Tenancy Act, § 2A:18-61.31.
14. Senior citizens must meet age and income requirements to qualify for this pro-
tection. See § 2A:18-61.30.
15. Section fourteen is one of the most controversial provisions of the Tenancy Act.
It states:
[Trhe court may invoke some or all of the provisions of the "Senior Citizens and
Disabled Protected Tenancy Act" and grant to a tenant, pursuant to that amenda-
tory and supplementary act, a protected tenancy period upon the court's determi-
nation that:
(1) The tenant would otherwise qualify as a senior citizen tenant or disabled
tenant pursuant to that amendatory and supplementary act, except that the build-
ing or structure in which the dwelling unit is located was converted prior to the
effective date of that amendatory and supplementary act; and
(2) The granting of the protected tenancy period as applied to the tenant, giv-
ing particular consideration to whether a unit was sold on or before the date that
the amendatory and supplementary act takes effect to a bona fide individual pur-
chaser who intended personally to occupy the unit, would not be violative of con-
cepts of fundamental fairness or due process.
19861
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converted prior to the Tenancy Act's effective date, notwithstanding
the interests of purchasers intending to occupy the unit. The remain-
ing two plaintiffs executed sales contracts with East Coast to purchase
condominiums after the Tenancy Act's effective date.16 Fearing the
adverse effects the Tenancy Act might have on their interests, East
Coast and Troy filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of the Act."7 Several months later, the four con-
dominium unit purchasers joined East Coast and Troy as plaintiffs to
test their rights as purchasers against the Tenancy Act.18 Plaintiffs al-
leged that the retroactive operation of section fourteen of the Tenancy
Act was an impairment of contract and a taking of property without
just compensation. 9 The federal district court agreed and awarded
plaintiffs partial summary judgment under both theories.20 On appeal,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding no taking or im-
pairment of contract by the statute's operation.2'
Fearing abusive state actions that would affect both private contracts
and property use, the Framers of the Constitution fashioned the con-
tract clause 22 and the taking clause2 3 as limits upon such state actions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18.61.11 (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
Thus, although purchasers of units converted prior to the law would not expect the
law to apply to them, courts may retroactively impose it.
16. 727 F.2d at 293. All four purchaser-plaintiffs closed contracts after the effective
date of the Tenancy Act. Id. Two individuals, however, executed agreements before
the legislature passed the Tenancy Act. The record does not indicate whether these
purchasers were buying for investment or occupancy purposes. Id.
17. Id. at 293. They named as defendants the New Jersey Community Affairs Com-
mission, the New Jersey Attorney General and three elderly tenants who allegedly
claimed benefits under the Tenancy Act. Id. These tenants did not have protected
status under the Tenancy Act at the time suit was filed because no protections were
available to them when they received their three-year notice to quit. Id. at 294. They
claimed such status retroactively under § 14.
18. Id. at 294.
19. Id. at 293-94.
20. Troy v. Renna, 580 F. Supp. 69, 72 (D.N.J. 1982). The district court held that
the provisions of the Tenancy Act contravened the contract clause because of its serious
disruption of the grantee's expectations. Id. (citing United States Trust v. New Jersey).
The court also found a taking because the retroactive operation of the Act "would be an
act of government placing in a private party the exclusive right to physical possessions
of specific property for an extended period of time." Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CA TV Corp.).
21. Troy v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
22. Attempts by states to sequester debts owed to British creditors prompted enact-
ment of the contract clause. See Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 422-23 (1934).
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Although the Framers intended the contract clause to prohibit state
interference with contracts between private individuals,24 the Supreme
Court soon expanded the clause's application to prevent states from
repudiating their own contracts.25 Despite some erosion of this ex-
panded application of the contract clause,26 the Court consistently ap-
plied rigorous scrutiny to state interference with private contracts27
until the landmark case of Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell.2s
In Blaisdell, creditors challenged under the contract clause a Minne-
sota law that delayed mortgage foreclosures. 29  Enacted as a tempo-
rary, 30 emergency 31 measure, the law granted mortgagors an extended
period for redeeming real property from foreclosure and sale, but re-
quired them to pay reasonable rent and interest during the period.
3 2
The United States Supreme Court upheld the law as a proper exercise
23. Virtually no history exists to explain why the Framers enacted the takings
clause. Scholars indicate it may stem from controversies during the colonial period,
especially the case of Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (S. Ct. of Pa., 1788). The
Continental Congress passed an emergency wartime law requiring that landowners con-
tribute provisions to nearby depots. One such depot subsequently fell to the British, and
after the war, plaintiff unsuccessfully demanded compensation. See generally F. Bos-
SELMAN, P. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 87 (1973). Others suggest the
intellectual bases for the clause are rooted in the Magna Carta, English common law
and the work of Sir William Blackstone. Id. at 100-04.
24. B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (1938).
25. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). In Fletcher, the Court inval-
idated a Georgia law that repealed a previous grant of land to several companies. See
also Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (New Hampshire
could not put its hand-picked trustees on the college board by increasing the board size
because this contravened the royal charter of the college).
26. Gradually, courts allowed states some flexibility to alter their own contracts.
See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880) (state can change the remedies of a con-
tract as long as it does not destroy the underlying obligation); cf. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42
U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843) (court held that a state can change the remedies in a contract
as long as the obligation is not destroyed as a result).
27. See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 84-85 (1823) ("[a]ny deviation
from a [contract's] terms ... however minute or apparently immaterial, in their effect
. impairs the obligation").
28, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
29. Id. at 415-16.
30. Id. at 421 n.3.
31. Economic conditions dunng the Depression caused widespread mortgage fore-
closures and subsequent execution of sale prices greatly below real market values. Id.
32. Id. at 445.
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of state police power.33 The Court evaluated the law by first examining
whether the legislation addressed a legitimate end, and second,
whether the measures taken to achieve the end were reasonable and
appropriate.3" Balancing the rights of individuals against the public
welfare,35 the Court found the law reasonable because it was only a
temporary response36 to an emergency,37 did not create advantages for
particular individuals or groups38 and contained conditions fair to all
parties. 39 Finally, the Court deferred to the legislature's choice of pol-
icy.4' Blaisdell's balancing approach became the litmus test for con-
tract clause cases; few successful challenges have resulted from this
test.
4 1
33. The police power stems from the sovereignty of the states. Id. at 437. As such,
its power to "protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the peo-
ple" is not prevented by the contracts clause, even if it affects private contracts. Id.
This power is "read into [all] contracts as a postulate of the legal order." Id. at 435.
34. Id. at 438.
35. Id. at 442.
36. Most emergency laws explicitly are limited either for a specific period of time or
until the end of the emergency. See, e.g., East New York Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230
(1945) (New York moratorium law precluded foreclosures on mortgages for one year);
Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (two year rent controls).
Blaisdell suggests, however, that allowing a law to continue until the end of the emer-
gency is not fatal to its constitutionality, for "[i]t is always open to judicial inquiry
whether the exigency still exists ...." Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442. See also Chastleton
Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924) (a law will cease to operate if the emer-
gency ceases or facts change); Newell v. Rent Control Board, 378 Mass. 443, 449, 392
N.E.2d 837, 840 (1979) ("The continuing existence of an emergency is a question that
may be presented for further consideration, not only to the Legislature and the city, but
also to the courts.").
37. See also Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (an emer-
gency housing law allows holdover tenancies and rent controls); Marcus Brown Hold-
ing Co. v. Geldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921) (a housing emergency caused by World War I
justified prohibiting landlords from evicting holdover tenants); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921) (a housing shortage caused by World War I justified lease extensions and
rent controls).
38. 290 U.S. at 445.
39. Id. at 446. The relief afforded by the statute gave due "regard to the interest of
mortgagees as well as to the interest of mortgagors" because it did not destroy a credi-
tor's remedy and required rental payments. Id. Cf. East New York Savings v. Hahn,
326 U.S. 230, 234 (there was no "studied indifference to the interest of the mortgagor or
to his appropriate protection").
40. 290 U.S. at 447-48.
41. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940). In Veix, the
Court upheld a New Jersey law that regulated the rights of savings and loan members to
withdraw funds. Id. at 41. There was a legitimate public need to regulate and tile
legislature had done so before. Id. at 39. See also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
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In United States Trust v. New Jersey,42 the Court expanded the Blais-
dell balancing test and reinvigorated contract clause protections. In
United States Trust, the Court held that contracts which a state had
previously entered into cannot be modified at will for legitimate public
purposes.43 In 1974, New Jersey retroactively repealed a 1962 agree-
ment with Port Authority bondholders providing that the state would
not allocate bond revenues for unprofitable rail operations.' Bond-
holders challenged the repeal as a contract impairment in violation of
the contract clause.45 The Court expanded the Blaisdell test by exam-
ining whether the impairment was both reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose.4 6 The Court noted that it owed less
deference to legislation that impaired state contracts because states
likely will act in their own self-interest.47 Although recognizing the
importance of the state's interest, 48 the Court held repeal of the cove-
nant was a serious impairment49 that was neither necessary 50 nor rea-
sonable5 to serve the state's interests.
Just as United States Trust promised greater success for challenges
497 (1965). Texas imposed a time limit, when none previously existed, for reinstating
title to forfeited lands. Id. at 499. Since the time Texas originally sold the land, oil had
been discovered on it. Id. at 511. Despite this element of self-interest, the law was
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power because the law stabilized an inefficient
system of land titles. Id. at 513. But see W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56
(1934). In Kavanaugh, the City of Little Rock issued bonds and mortgage benefit as-
sessments as security. Id. at 57. Thereafter, in response to an emergency, the state
passed laws greatly diminishing the remedies for recouping those securities. Id. at 58-
59. The Court deemed that change unreasonable, oppressive and indifferent to the in-
terests of the mortgagee. Id. at 62. Changes were not reasonable when they made the
remedy a "mere shadow." Id.
42. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id. at 9, 14. The state claimed that it needed the funds to finance public com-
muter rail systems. Id. at 29.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id. at 25-26.
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id. at 29-31.
50. Id. The Court found that the repeal of the convenant was unnecessary because
less drastic alternatives than total repeal were available, such as amending the covenant
to divert only new revenues for subsidizing mass transit. Id. at 30 n.28.
51. Id. at 31-32. The Court held that the repeal was unreasonable because the con-
ditions that justified the repeal in 1974, existed when the covenant was made in 1962.
Id. The Court noted that "the need for mass transportation in the New York metropol-
itan area was not a new development, and the likelihood that publicly owned commuter
1986]
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to impairments of state contracts, Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Span-
naus 52 signaled greater success for challenges to impairments of pri-
vate contracts. In'Allied Steel, the Court invalidated a Minnesota law
that imposed a pension funding charge on certain employers who ter-
minated their pension plans or closed their Minnesota offices.53 The
Court held the law unreasonable as a substantial impairment of a com-
pany's contractual obligations to employees under its pension plan.5 4
As in United States Trust, the Court added several factors to the bal-
ancing test. First, the Court found the impairment substantial because
the law changed employer obligations in an area in which employee
reliance was vital.55 Furthermore, this change was completely unex-
pected.56  After characterizing the law as unreasonable, the Court
noted that Minnesota's statute was dissimilar to state laws surviving
previous contract clause challenges.57 In distinguishing Blaisdell, the
Court emphasized that the Minnesota legislature did not enact the law
to deal with broad, generalized economic or social problems.58 The
statute only burdened a small group of employers who established for
employees a voluntary private pension plans that qualified under sec-
tion 401 of the Internal Revenue Code.59
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co.60 indi-
cated that the contract clause does not offer the bite that Allied Steel
promised. Energy Reserves Group (ERG), a gas supplier, challenged
the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, which imposed maxi-
railroads would produce substantial deficits was well known .... It was with full
knowledge of these concerns that the 1962 covenant was adopted." Id.
52. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
53. Id. at 250-52. The law applied only to private employers with pension plans.
Id. at 238.
54. Id. at 245.
55. Id. at 246. The company had carefully calculated its risks to ensure an adequate
supply of funds to pay all pensionees. Id. The new law imposed a $185,000 charge on
the company, which the court considered "disabling." Id. at 247.
56. The measure was completely unexpected because no previous regulation existed
in the area. Id. at 250.
57. Id. The Court found it significant that the law dealt with a narrow class rather
than a general social interest. Id. The Court also recognized that it was a severe,
permanent change. Id.
58. Id. "[I]ts narrow aim was leveled, not at every Minnesota employer, not even at
every Minnesota employer who left the state, but only at those who had in the past...
voluntarily [agreed] to establish pension plans for their employees." Id.
59. Id. at 248.
60. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
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mum prices for intrastate gas. 6' ERG asserted that this law, unlike
federal law,6 2 prohibited it from using a price escalator clause con-
tained in its contract with Kansas Light and Power.63 In three short
steps, the Court disposed of plaintiff's claims.' First, the Court found
no substantial impairment because ERG's "reasonable expectations"
were not impaired.65 Unlike Allied Steel, all parties were fully aware of
the heavy regulation within this field and the potential for further regu-
latory change.66 The Court next held that the law served legitimate
public purposes.67 Given a legitimate public purpose, the Court then
found that the conditions "adjusting the rights and responsibilities of
all parties" were reasonable.68  In discussing the reasonableness re-
quirement, the Court stressed that it owed great deference to the legis-
lature's judgment.69
United States Trust, Allied Steel and Energy Reserves demonstrate
that although the Court once again has made it more difficult for states
to impair their own contracts, it merely redefined the balancing process
61. Id. at 408. Intrastate gas denotes gas produced in-state that is not committed to
interstate commerce. Id.
62. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982 ed., Supp. V)
allowed price ceilings on gas to rise monthly.
63. 459 U.S. at 408.
64. Id. at 413-19.
65. Id. at 416.
66. Id. at 413.
67. Id. at 416-17. It protected consumers against price increases caused by federal
deregulation and corrected the imbalance between interstate and intrastate markets. Id.
at 417.
68. Id. at 418.
69. Id. This summary treatment of contract clause challenges is evident in recent
cases. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983). In Exxon, Alabama raised
the severance tax for oil and and gas and prohibited companies from passing the tax on
to customers. Id. at 2299. The Court held that the Act was not a substantial impair-
ment because the area previously was regulated and parties knew beforehand that all
contracts were subject to regulations. Id. at 2307 n.14. Even if it were a substantial
impairment, the Court held that the law was still valid because it had a broad public
purpose. Id. at 2306. The law applied equally to all oil and gas producers. Id. Finally,
the Court expressed its desire not to interfere with the state's decision-making authority.
Id. See also Sollenne v. Seiden, 118 Misc. 2d 541, 463 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1983). In Sol-
lenne, state law prevented a purchaser of a condominium unit from evicting a senior
citizen so the purchaser could personnally occupy the unit. Id. at 542, 463 N.Y.S.2d at
132. The court found the law protecting the senior citizen reasonable and legitimate.
As a result, the petitioner's rights were subordinate to the "superior possessory rights"
of the tenant. Id. at 542-43, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
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used in impairment challenges for private contracts. 70 As a result,
courts continue to decide cases on an ad hoe basis, with varying
results.71
The Constitution prohibits the appropriation of private property for
public use without payment of just compensation.72 To advance legiti-
mate public interests, however, a state can regulate the use of private
property without paying just compensation.73 Whether a court labels
an action a regulation or a taking depends on the facts of each case.74
Typically, courts balance various factors and then label the action
either a taking or a regulation in order to arrive at a certain result.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon75 illustrated that when a state goes
too far in regulating property interests, the state must compensate
property owners. In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company claimed that
state law76 prevented it from excavating coal located beneath a house it
70. Factors in this redefinition include the concepts of prospectivity, generality and
sensitivity to impairment of public contracts. Note, Rediscovering the Contracts Clause,
97 HARV. L. Rlv. 1414, 1426-31 (1984). With regard to prospectivity, both United
States Trust and Allied Steel involved unexpected impairments in areas in which parties
placed great reliance on their pre-existing legal rights. Id. at 1416. But cf Energy
Reserves and Veix (areas were already heavily regulated, thus it was foreseeable that
further regulation could follow).
Similiarly, in Allied Steel the Court was concerned that the new law burdened a nar-
row class. See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 250. The laws in dispute in Exxon and Energy
Reserves, however, were aimed at broad groups. See generally Note, supra note 70, at
1419 (the contract clause does not invalidate "generally applicable rules of conduct"
advancing broad public interests).
The Court also revived its distinction concerning the levels of scrutiny required for
impairments of public and private contracts. Id. Compare United States Trust, 431
U.S. at 26 (no automatic deference to state legislation when a state's self-interest is
involved) with El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (deference is the norm, even
when a state repudiates its own bad deals).
71. For criticisms of the ad hoe balancing approach see Note, A Procedural Ap-
proach to the Contract Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 918, 919-23 (1984) (balancing allows exces-
sive discretion, which distorts the law and generates uncertainty; ad hoc decision
making also gives judges an opportunity to exercise bias when no clear rules serve to
guide them).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
73. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915) (town prohibited
brickmaker from manufacturing bricks within city limits to protect citizens from the
plant's noxious fumes).
74. "There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins."
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
75. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
76. Kohler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198. The legislature enacted the Act to prevent the
subsidence of housing caused by mining. 260 U.S. at 412.
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had sold to plaintiffs. The Court held that the state caused a compen-
sable taking when it deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to mine its
coal. The Court first labelled the act a legitimate use of state regula-
tory power because it protected the public by preventing the subsidence
of streets." The Court then held that the public should pay for the loss
because the act greatly diminished the value of the property.78
The Court expanded the Pennsylvania Coal test in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.79 In Penn Central, a landmark
preservation law prohibited Penn Central from building a multistory
office building on top of its terminal.8" The company unsuccessfully
charged that the restrictions amounted to an uncompensated taking.81
The Court stated that a taking analysis was essentially an ad hoc in-
quiry that should focus on two sets of factors: (1) the character of the
action," and (2) the 'nature and extent of the interference with rights
in the parcel as a whole." 3 The first set of factors helps a court to
properly label the disputed action. The Court stated that it more likely
would depict physical invasions of property as takings, but view
schemes that redistributed economic benefits for the public good as
regulations.8 4
The second set of factors enables a court to determine whether the
regulation should be compensable. Factors that gauge the regulation's
impact on the property as a whole include the extent of interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations 85 and the extent to
77. Id. at 415.
78. The court stated that to make it impracticable to mine the coal was tantamount
to confiscating or destroying it. Id. at 414-15. "[A] strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 416.
79. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
80. Id. at 117-18. The Landmarks Preservation Commission denied Penn Central
permission to construct the building due to its incongruity with the terminal's architec-
ture. Id.
81. Id. at 107, 138.
82. Id. at 130.
83. Id. at 130-31.
84. Id. at 124. The Court relied on United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in
which the Court held that frequent airplane flights over plaintiff's property destroyed its
use as a chicken farm, to differentiate between regulations that limited the right to use
property from those that amounted to physical invasions. 438 U.S. 104, 128. In
Causby, the Court found a taking even though the regulation did not completely destroy
the plaintiff's use of the property. 328 U.S. 256, 261. The Causby Court reached this
result because the government physically invaded the farm. Id.
85. Id. at 124. The law did not prohibit plaintiffs from receiving a fair return on
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which the regulation denies plaintiff use of its property.86 Dinimution
in property value alone is not determinative.87 Because the Penn Cen-
tral regulation was not a physical invasion, did not interfere with plain-
tiff's use of the parcel as a whole, and was necessary for the general
welfare, the Court found no taking.88
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,89 the Court expanded the Penn
Central test by stressing that the type of right subject to regulation was
crucial in resolving the taking issue.9° In Kaiser Aetna, the owner of a
shallow lagoon dredged it in order to develop a private marina.9 The
government considered the pond navigable water92 and ordered that
the owner provide public access to it.9 3 The Court held that the power
to exclude was such a fundamental property right94 that the govern-
ment could not impair it without compensation.95 The owner's charac-
terization of the action as a physical invasion of property also
influenced the Court's decision. 96
their property. Id. at 136. It simply prevented them from using it in the most profitable
manner. Id. at 125.
86. Id. at 136. Plaintiff was not denied all use of its air space. Additionally, its air
rights were transferrable to nearby parcels of property. Id.
87. The potential loss of income from the restriction, standing alone, did not estab-
lish a taking. Id. at 131. Cf Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. at 397 (an 871/2%
diminution in value caused by a zoning ordinance did not constitute a taking).
88. Id. at 138.
89. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
90. Id. at 179-80.
91. Id. at 166.
92. Id. at 168. The government controls navigable waterways. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 179-80.
95. Id. Although Penn Central implied that regulations that merely limited an
owner's economic rights were not takings, while those that affected fundamental posses-
sory rights were takings, this distinction was not formalized. See Note, supra note 2, at
477.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), articulated this distinction. According to the
terms of the Eagle Protection Act, plaintiff could not sell Indian artifacts made from
protected bird feathers. Id. at 54. He challenged the Act as a taking. Id. at 55. The
Court viewed property rights as a bundle of strands of varying importance, and found it
crucial that the plaintiff retained "possessory rights." Id. at 65-66. The law only denied
plaintiff the right to economically exploit his property. Id. at 66. The Court empha-
sized that it was concerned with how regulations affected property as a whole. Id. at 66.
See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance restricting use of
plaintiff's land was valid because it allowed the owner beneficial use of his land and did
not extinguish any fundamental attributes of ownership).
96. 444 U.S. at 180.
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The Court heightened the importance it affords to possessory rights,
and violation of such rights through physical invasion, in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.9 7 In the interests of the pub-
lic,9" the State of New York allowed cable television companies to in-
stall cable equipment on private property for a nominal fee.9 9 Upon
discovering that her building housed cables and taps for defendant's
cable service, a landlord successfully challenged the law as a taking.
The Court stated that when a regulation authorized the "permanent"° °
physical occupation" of property, it constituted a taking regardless of
the public interest served.' 1o In effect, the Court rejected the balancing
approach when an action resulted in the permanent physical occupa-
tion of property. Loretto, however, affirmed the principle that states
retain broad powers to regulate housing conditions and landlord-tenant
relationships without compensating all economic injuries. 10 2
97. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
98. This did not amount to an emergency regulation. The state enacted the law in
order to "develop and offer to the public a means of communication having important
educational and community aspects." Id. at 425.
99. A one-time, one dollar fee was the fixed rate of compensation for landlords. Id.
at 423-24.
100. The Court distinguished permanent physical occupations, physical invasions
short of an occupation (as in Causby) and regulations merely restricting the use of
property (as in Penn Central). Id. at 430-35.
The Court stated that a permanent occupation "chops through the bundle" of prop-
erty rights, taking a piece of each strand. Id. at 435. It destroys the owner's right to
possess the space himself and renders him powerless to exclude the occupier. Id. Per-
manent occupation also forbids the owner from making any nonpossessory use of the
property. Id. The Court recognized that even when an owner retained the right to
control use of the space, that right was an empty one if the space was occupied perma-
nently. Id.
101. Id. at 434-35. The Court characterized the occupation as permanent because it
lasted until Teleprompter elected to remove the equipment. Id. at 439.
102. This power encompasses regulations governing discrimination in housing, rent
control, emergency housing laws, fire protections, utility connections and building
codes. Id. at 440. The Court views these as appropriate restrictions on the use of
property. As long as these regulations do not require the landlord to "suffer the physi-
cal occupation of a portion of his building by a third party," they should be analyzed
under the Penn Central balancing test. Id. at 440.
Several recent cases illustrate the exception granted to states in the housing context
by courts. In Grace v. Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979), a severe
housing shortage caused the city to impose a six-month moratorium on all evictions
stemming from condominium conversions. Id. at 45 n.4, 399 N.E.2d at 1039 n.4. Sev-
eral plaintiffs bought their condominiums before the law went into effect but were
barred from personally occupying them. Id. at 47-48, 399 N.E.2d at 1040. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Masschusetts did not consider the moratorium a taking.
First, it labelled the law a regulation necessary to protect the public interest. Id. at 50-
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Recently, in Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Acheson Calla-
han,10 3 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review a taking's
challenge within the housing context. In Fresh Pond, the Cambridge
rent board denied a landlord permission to evict the sole occupant of a
building slated for demolition."° On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of a substantial federal ques-
tion." 5  Rehnquist's vigorous dissent' 0 6 did not persuade the Court
that this result was inconsistent with Loretto.10 7
In Troy, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals first held that the Ten-
ancy Act did not violate the contracts clause. It rejected the lower
51, 399 N.E.2d at 1042-43. The court then stated that the law's impact on the property
was not excessive, for although it temporarily redistributed property rights, owners con-
tinued to receive reasonable rent from tenants. Id. at 57, 399 N.E.2d at 1046. The
court considered the duration of the regulation important, insofar as a longer period
might be considered confiscatory. Id.
In Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981), the same
court used essentially the same process to reach similar results. In response to a local
housing shortage, the city controlled the removal of rental properties from the market.
Id. at 155, 418 N.E.2d at 337. After rental property owners converted their rental units
to condominiums, the city denied requests to remove the units from the market. Id. at
154-55, 418 N.E.2d at 337. The court found that the city ordered the denial in order to
protect the renting public. Id. at 156-57, 418 N.E.2d at 337-38. The denial did not
interfere with the owners' rights in the parcel as a whole because they could still obtain
a reasonable return on their investment. Id. at 160-61, 418 N.E.2d at 340.
The ordinance at issue in Grace later was modified and became the focus of a takings
challenge in Loeterman v. Brookline, 524 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Mass. 1981). Loeterman
involved emergency regulations that indefinitely barred condominium purchasers from
evicting tenants who had lived in units for a certain period of time. Id. at 1327 n.1.
Plaintiff wanted to evict a tenant so that he could personally occupy the unit. Id. at
1327. The federal district court upheld the regulations even though they granted ten-
ants potential life-time tenancies. Id. at 1330. The Court reasoned that tenants still
paid plaintiffs fair rent and that the emergency was not permanent. Id. The court indi-
cated that both the city and the courts could repeal the ordinance if situations changed.
Id.
103. 464 U.S. 875 (1983), dismissing appeal from 388 Mass. 1051, 446 N.E.2d 1060
(1983).
104. Id. at 875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 876-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 875. This denial reaffirms and clarifies the Court's position in Loretto
regarding states' broad powers to redistribute property interests, especially during emer-
gencies. Takings challenges in these situations will be unsuccessful.
107. Id. at 875-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His arguments emphasized that this
occupation was much more severe than in Loretto. Id. The occupation was permanent
like in Loretto because only the occupier could end the tenancy. Furthermore, there
was no end to the emergency in sight. Id. Like Loretto, the precious right of a property
owner to exclude others was shattered completely. Id.
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court's assertion that United States Trust controlled the outcome.10 8
United States Trust, the court reasoned, dictated a higher degree of
scrutiny only when states repudiated their own contracts.'0 9 The court
of appeals instead used the Energy Reserves test, which specifically ap-
plied to impairments of private contracts. 10 Because the contracting
parties knew beforehand that their rights already were regulated heav-
ily,"' the court held it unlikely that an extension of such regulation
amounted to a substantial impairment." 2 The court next held that the
conditions imposed by the Act were reasonable because purchasers re-
ceived fair rent with allowable increases." 3 Additionally, it was possi-
ble that the extended tenancy would terminate prematurely."14 Even if
the Tenancy Act's conditions amounted to a substantial impairment,
the court found that the housing emergency justified the impair-
ment. " 5 Like the Supreme Court in Energy Reserves, the Third Cir-
cuit did not question the reasonableness of legislative choice." 6 The
court implied, however, that if the emergency subsided, or policy
choices ameliorated the housing crisis, courts could use discretion in
deciding whether to confer benefits on eligible tenants.' 1 7
Applying the principles of Loretto, the court next concluded that the
Tenancy Act did not constitute a taking of private property. First, the
Tenancy Act did not authorize a permanent occupation because either
landlord or tenant could terminate the lease. 18 In addition, the court
relied on dicta from Loretto that approved of legislation that author-
ized extended tenancies. 9 The court further noted that unlike Loretto,
108. 727 F.2d 287, 296.
109. Id,
110, Id.
Ill. Id. at 297. For example, the Anti-Eviction Act allowed tenants a maximum
eight-year tenure. Id. at 290.
112. Id. at 297.
113. Id. at 298.
114. Id. The tenancy could terminate if the tenant voluntarily moved, was evicted
for cause, had a significant income change or ceased making the unit his main residence.
Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Tenancy Act gave courts discretion in deciding to confer protections
on eligible tenants. Id.
118. Id. at 301. The court also reasoned that the occupancy would not be perma-
nent because the average age of protected tenants was 70. Id.
119. Id.
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Troy did not involve the public use of plaintiff's property. 2 ' Instead,
the Tenancy Act merely regulated use of the property. The Court in
Loretto, the court reasoned, recognized this historic distinction, espe-
cially when housing regulation was concerned. 2' The Supreme
Court's dismissal of Fresh Pond was further proof to the Third Circuit
that Loretto did not prohibit regulations granting extended tenan-
cies.' 22 Because Troy involved a regulation rather than a public use of
the property, and because the court found no permanent invasion, no
violation of the taking clause occurred. 12 3
The tension between interpretations of the balancing test in the con-
tracts clause and the taking clause makes Troy a difficult case to decide.
The Supreme Court recently reinvigorated contract clause protec-
tions.'24 At the same time, however, both the Supreme Court and
lower courts have rejected most fifth amendment taking challenges to
housing regulations involving grants of extended tenancies.1 2' This
suggests that a court potentially could hold the same law valid under a
taking challenge but invalid under a contract clause challenge.
The Third Circuit could have reached such a conclusion in Troy.
One of the primary tests, as announced in Allied Steel, is whether the
regulation's burdens are applied equally to the regulated group.126 In
Troy, the Tenancy Act clearly causes similar effects on the contractual
relationships of all condominium developers. It is not clear, however,
that the Tenancy Act falls with equal effect on all unit purchasers.' 2 7
Some purchasers buy to invest and others buy for personal occupancy.
120. Id.
121. Id. The court cited Loretto's approval of cases such as Edgar A. Levy Leasing
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) and Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (each case
involved limits on a landlord's right to evict holdover tenants during housing
shortages).
122. 727 F.2d at 303.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 42-71 and accompanying text (discussing United States Trust,
Allied Structural Steel and Energy Reserves).
125. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text (discussing Loretto, Fresh Pond
and Grace). On its face, Loretto indicates that the Court will not condone the perma-
nent occupation of an owner's property in any context. See supra notes 100-02 and
accompanying text. Fresh Pond appears to contradict this by authorizing regulations
that allow tenants to remain in an owner's unit indefinitely. The Court evidently does
not characterize emergency housing laws, no matter how indefinite, as permanent. See
cf supra notes 37-38.
126. 438 U.S. at 248.
127. See Note, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting Tenants
From Condominium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 179, 222 (1983) ("Condo-
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Under the Tenancy Act, an investment purchaser's interests are not
substantially impaired because he still receives rent, although reduced,
as planned. The Tenancy Act does, however, substantially impair the
interest of the occupancy purchaser. It shatters the important expecta-
tions of occupancy 128 that induced the individual to purchase in much
the same way that New Jersey's repeal of its 1962 contract in United
States Trust destroyed the expectations that induced bondholders to
buy.' 29 Although the housing area was regulated heavily, 30 occu-
pancy purchasers reasonably could expect to occupy their unit within
four years at the earliest. 3' By retroactively conferring protected sta-
tus on a tenant, the court destroys a purchaser's expectation of occu-
pancy within a reasonable time. Given Loretto's emphasis on the
importance of the right to exclude, 132 as well as Allied Steel's prohibi-
tion against change in areas in which the element of reliance is vital,1
33
the Tenancy Act imposed a substantial impairment on the rights of
occupancy purchasers. On the whole, the "adjustment of rights and
responsibilities" that Energy Reserves stressed is not based on "reason-
able conditions."' 34 Arguably, the Troy court could have considered
the contract clause challenge more fully and reached a different result.
The court correctly concluded the takings issue. Given the dicta in
Loretto granting states broad power to regulate housing conditions, as
well as the Fresh Pond decision, even emergency housing laws that pro-
tect tenants indefinitely through extended tenancies are not takings.
The Third Circuit correctly categorized the Tenancy Act as a regula-
tion, but should have proceeded further and determined whether the
regulation was compensable. As Pennsylvania Coal Co. '35 pointed out,
regulations are sometimes takings. Therefore, the court should have
minium conversion... affect[s] investment and occupancy interests in ways which differ
in kind and in degree.").
128. Id. at 225. ("Reliance is more important in cases involving occupancy inter-
ests than in cases involving investment interests."). See supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text.
129. 431 U.S. at 19.
130. The Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1 to 61.12 (West Supp.
1983) (regulated the rights of the parties before the state passed the Tenancy Act).
131. The Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.11(c).
132. 458 U.S. at 435 ("The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one
of the most treasured ... property rights.").
133. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 233.
134. Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412.
135. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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applied the multifactor Penn Central test as Loretto advises. Under
this analysis, however, there is no taking. Although purchasers expect-
ing to occupy property may be unable to do so for an indefinite period
of time, modern courts see these setbacks as merely temporary in na-
ture.136 Additionally, use of the property is not destroyed completely,
because owners still receive reasonable rent. Finally, the court in Troy
would find no taking on physical invasion grounds because Loretto and
Fresh Pond provide that housing regulations permitting extended ten-
ancies during housing emergencies are not considered physical
invasions.
Troy demonstrates that the search for clear frameworks to analyze
taking and contract clause challenges is an elusive one. The court's
reliance on an evolving balancing test provides little certainty for indi-
viduals staking their financial resources and personal expectations on
private contracts. The court's discretion to emphasize selected factors
in the balancing test fosters varied outcomes dependent largely upon
the skill of attorneys and the values of courts. This process provides
flexibility, but may have a long-range detrimental impact. Condomin-
ium conversions provide many direct advantages for the public. 37 Be-
cause of the uncertainty in their right to possess, individuals may
hesitate to invest in condominiums. Lack of a clear analytical frame-
work thus may create negative incentives for investment, which in turn
may change the positive role condominiums have played in revitalizing
urban areas.'3 8 In this sense, the court's framework affects not only an
individual's rights and expectations, but also may set in motion policy
consequences that are detrimental to the public welfare. 1 39
Jerilynn D. Troxell
136. See Fresh Pond, 464 U.S. 875; Loeterman v. Brookline, 524 F. Supp. at 1330.
137. See generally Note, Condominium Conversion Legislation: Limitation on Use
or Deprivation of Rights? A Re-examination, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 834 (1980)
(condominiums stabilize neighborhoods, generate an influx of capital and are the only
viable method of home ownership for many persons); see supra note 3.
138. Note, supra note 137, at 835.
139. These consequences become more undesirable in light of research showing that
conversion only superficially causes displacement. Note, supra note 3, at 312. A na-
tional shortage of low-income housing, coupled with a growing poverty class, is at the
heart of the displacement problem. Note, supra note 137, at 835. The most effective
solutions to the displacement problem are those aimed at its sources, not symptoms. Id.
at 835. The efficacy of a policy discouraging conversions appears minimal.
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